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I. Introduction 
This Essay on religious conceptions of corporate purpose was 
prepared, in part, to commemorate the incredibly rich corporate 
law scholarship of Professors Lyman Johnson and David Millon. 
Consequently, my reflections on this topic will draw heavily and 
primarily from the work of these two outstanding academicians.  
As far back as 1986, in what appears to be his second 
published piece of scholarship, Lyman Johnson points out the 
necessity of confronting the issue of “corporate purpose.”1 An 
Aristotelian myself, I heartily subscribe to Professor Johnson’s 
                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Distance Education, Maurice A. 
Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. 
 1. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are 
They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 788 (1986) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?] (“Given the turmoil 
that takeovers have caused in corporate life and corporate law, it seems 
appropriate to reconsider the issue of corporate purpose.”). 
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emphasis on purposes, for how else can one assess the goodness of 
a thing, or of its conduct, without an appreciation of its teleology?2 
As the title suggests, this Essay will examine religious 
conceptions of corporate purpose. More specifically, I shall examine 
whether a business corporation may, may not, or must have a 
religious purpose—as these three perspectives exhaust the various 
possibilities. In other words: might a business corporation adopt a 
religious purpose at its own discretion? Or, are all business 
corporations precluded from adopting a religious purpose by their 
very nature? Or, finally, might it be the case that business 
corporations invariably have a religious purpose, regardless of 
whether this is explicitly recognized or not (by either the 
corporation itself or the public at large)? 
I will advance the admittedly aggressive position that the 
third of these three perspectives is the correct one: that the nature 
and purposes of business corporations are unavoidably religious. 
In doing so, I seek to respond to Professor Johnson’s call that 
“corporate law scholars find creative ways to give greater 
prominence to a more organic sensibility, a sensibility emphasizing 
in the cultural-business sphere the same appreciation for 
sustainable human endeavor now being underscored in the 
heightened environmental consciousness.”3 
In embarking upon this project, I also take up Professor 
Johnson’s call to “re-enchant” corporate law.4 Time and again, 
Professor Johnson has urged the necessity of “acknowledging 
faith’s importance—even in the workplace.”5 As he has explained, 
                                                                                                     
 2. See Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), SPARKNOTES, http://www.sparknotes.com/ 
philosophy/aristotle/themes.html (last visited May 2, 2017) (“Teleology is the 
study of the ends or purposes that things serve, and Aristotle’s emphasis on 
teleology has repercussions throughout his philosophy. Aristotle believed that the 
best way to understand why things are the way they are is to understand what 
purpose they were designed to serve.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 3. Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate 
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2249 (1992) [hereinafter Johnson, Individual 
and Collective Sovereignty]. 
 4. See Lyman Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. 
L. REV. 83, 105 (2010) (“[T]o re-enchant the corporation (or to acknowledge its 
continuing enchantment) is to permit people of faith and spirituality to ground 
their work lives on something enduring and transcendent, rather than on 
something precarious and fleeting.”). 
 5. Id. at 106. 
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this “permits an emphasis on the forgotten associational elements 
of corporateness.”6 For example, the Bible’s “ancient admonition 
against ‘serving two masters’ underlies the fiduciary duty of 
loyalty in corporate law. And it has much to say about ‘faithfulness’ 
in general, the core demand of a fiduciary’s loyal behavior.”7 Thus, 
a failure to perceive the significant contribution that religious 
traditions and perspectives can have on our understanding of the 
corporation yields an approach to corporate law that is sapped of 
its full potential vibrancy and robustness.  
I would go a step further, however, and invoke Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky’s observation that “without God, all things are 
permitted.”8 In an era characterized by repeated instances of gross 
corporate misconduct, coupled with ceaseless calls for greater 
corporate responsibility, it seems baffling to omit from the 
discussion the phenomenon of religion, which arguably constitutes 
the greatest bridle of mankind’s passions and one of the most 
important shapers of human behavior. 
In this Essay, I will proceed as follows: first, I will define the 
term “religion,”9 as this concept is central to our inquiry. Next, I 
will observe how the divorce of religion from economics and 
business, and how the treatment of business as a wholly secular 
undertaking, is a departure from historical norms.10 Thereafter, I 
will confront the central question of this Essay and explain why a 
corporation’s purpose is invariably religious in nature.11 Finally, I 
will conclude with a discussion of the repercussions flowing from 
this understanding of corporate purpose.12 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. 
 7. Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and 
Sinners, Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 853. 
 8. The quotation in this or similar forms is commonly attributed to 
Dostoevsky, but his actual words, to be completely accurate, were as follows: “If 
you were to destroy in mankind the belief in immortality, not only love but every 
living force maintaining the life of the world would at once be dried up. Moreover, 
then nothing would be immoral, everything would be lawful.” THE YALE BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 210–11 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (quoting THE BROTHERS 
KARAMAZOV bk. 2, ch. 6 (1880)). 
 9. Infra Part II.  
 10. Infra Part III. 
 11. Infra Parts IV–V. 
 12. Infra Part VI.  
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II. Religion Defined 
Let us begin our examination of religious conceptions of 
corporate purpose by defining the term “religious.” “Religious,” as 
used here, is an adjective meaning having to do with religion.13 
That, of course, only begs the question: what does “religion” mean? 
Although it is a question of some debate, it appears as though 
the word “religion” stems from the word “religare,” which means 
“to bind.”14 Thus, religion means to bind oneself to God (or, in the 
case of the ancients, to the gods).15  
Now, why would one do that? Why would one bind oneself to 
God? Different peoples and different people individually have done 
so for different reasons, including: out of fear;16 out of love;17 out of 
need;18 or, out of gratitude.19 
But let’s dig a little deeper. Out of fear or love of what? Out of 
need or gratitude of what? It would seem to be out of concern over 
the most basic human desire of all: “happiness” (or its absence).20 
And indeed, all religions, as far as I can tell, focus largely on the 
issue of human happiness, and provide guidance on how to best 
obtain it.21  
                                                                                                     
 13. See Religious, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/ 
religious (last visited May 2, 2017) (defining religious as “of, relating to, or 
concerned with religion”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 14. Religion, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/ 
cathen/12738a.htm (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 15. See id. (“We are tied to God and bound to Him . . . .”).  
 16. See id. (“A common theory with the Greek and Roman philosophers, 
favoured by a few writers of modern times, is that religion had its origin in 
fear . . . .”).  
 17. See id. (“Thirdly, the love of God for His own sake is a concomitant of the 
virtue of religion, being needed for its perfection.”). 
 18. See id. (“There thus arises in the natural order a sense of dependence on 
the Deity, deeply felt need of Divine help.”).   
 19. See id. (“We have already seen that fear is not the predominating tone 
even in lower religions, as is shown by the universal use of rites expressing joy, 
hope, and gratitude.”). 
 20. See id. (“What man aims at in religion is communion with the Deity, in 
which he hopes to attain his happiness and perfection.”).  
 21. See generally April L. Bogle, The Role of Happiness in the World 
Religions, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Oct. 17, 2010, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/april-l-bogle/dalai-lama-happiness-summit_b_7 
64783.html (last updated May 25, 2011) (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with 
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This, however, only presents us with yet another question: 
What exactly is happiness? On one end of the spectrum, 
“happiness” is conceptualized as revolving around material 
prosperity and creature comforts.22 On the other end of the 
spectrum happiness is conceptualized as the attainment of moral 
goodness—of human virtue and spiritual perfection.23 
Regardless of one’s position on the continuum, it should 
become quickly apparent, I posit that religion and the corporation 
have a lot to do with one another. For what else is the corporation 
other than a predominant form by which modern man has 
organized himself in his pursuit of happiness? In Western society 
at least (and perhaps this holds true for most of the world beyond 
as well), it is within the corporate form that most men and women 
work, it is from the corporation that men and women satisfy their 
myriad desires through purchasing goods and services, and it is in 
the corporation that countless individuals invest in order to attain 
their financial goals, be that the ability to retire comfortably, pay 
for their children’s educations, or simply accumulate wealth. In 
short, it is not unfair to say that both religion and the corporation 
are focused on the ascertainment of human happiness.  
Some may object that whereas religiously pursued happiness 
is spiritually oriented, corporately pursued happiness is 
economically oriented. I do not believe that such a blanket 
statement is sustainable. For it depends upon the religion, the 
corporation, and the individual. We’re all familiar with the 
“Prosperity Gospel” and Joel Osteen.24 And indeed, for the 
ancients, one of the reasons that religion was taken so seriously 
                                                                                                     
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 22. See Religion, CATH. ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/ 
cathen/12738a.htm (last visited May 2, 2017) (“The sum of happiness looked for 
is prosperity in the present life and a continuation of the same bodily comforts in 
the life to come.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 23. See id. (“In the higher religions, the perfection sought in religion becomes 
more intimately associated with moral goodness. In Christianity, the highest of 
religions, communion with God implies spiritual perfection of the highest possible 
kind . . . .”). 
 24. See generally Ted Olsen, Joel Osteen vs. Rick Warren on Prosperity 
Gospel, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.christianitytoday. 
com/ct/2006/septemberweb-only/137-41.0.html (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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was out of concern for very concrete, real-world, mundane (in the 
truest sense of the term) priorities.25  
On the flip side, to quote Professor Johnson: “Profit is a means, 
not an end.”26 Therefore, one’s efforts to increase his or her wealth 
via the corporate form (as either an investor or employee or 
consumer) may very well be done with an ultimate spiritual 
objective in mind. Perhaps the young man is working for Apple in 
order to save enough money to finance his seminary education, or 
perhaps the widow is investing in Sony in order to leave the most 
sizeable bequest possible to her church. Perhaps the rabbi is 
purchasing goods from Bed, Bath, and Beyond in order to make his 
synagogue a more fitting house of worship, for the greater glory of 
God. 
In short, therefore, I do not think it is particularly wise or 
accurate to compartmentalize the happiness one seeks into 
happiness sought via religion versus happiness sought via the 
corporation. I fully appreciate that some attempt to do this—to 
divide the world into spiritual and secular, placing religion into one 
category and the corporation into another. But this can also be 
undone, and for many, these lines are quite blurred. Corporate law 
ought not turn a blind eye to these possibilities. The reasons why 
individuals do what they do can be both myriad and quite 
complicated. Consequently, “[t]he discipline of corporate law 
should acknowledge the richness and complexity of commercial 
endeavor,”27 and eschew an approach that unrealistically 
constricts our understanding of the corporation (and its various 
actors). 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Joshua J. Mark, Religion in the Ancient World, ANCIENT HIST. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2009), https://www.ancient.eu/religion/ (last visited May 
2, 2017) (describing the history and role of religion in ancient cultures) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. Lyman Johnson, Michael Naughton & William Bojan, Rethinking How 
Business Purpose Is Taught in Catholic Business Education, 32 J. CATH. HIGHER 
ED. 59, 75 (2013 [hereinafter Johnson et al., Rethinking] 
 27. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate 
Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 936 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Delaware Judiciary]. 
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III. The Historical Linkage of Faith and Work 
As acknowledged, some individuals may choose to 
compartmentalize their spiritual life and their secular life. Some 
adhere to a separation of faith and work. I have not seen statistics 
demonstrating whether this approach is shared by the greater or 
lesser part of humankind today.28 
Historically speaking, however, such a compartmentalization, 
or separation, would have been quite anomalous.29 Throughout 
most of humanity’s existence, practically every decision of import 
was viewed as having moral repercussions and a religious 
dimension.30 Decisions about money, from how to earn it to how to 
spend it, were no exception.31 Indeed, it is no mere coincidence that 
economics, as a discipline, was originally a “branch of morality 
philosophy.”32 Important economic decisions are ordinarily 
understood as important moral decisions as well.33 And important 
moral decisions are, for every religion that I am aware of, typically 
important religious decisions too. 
Recall the words of Christ, which, I believe, would resonate 
with non-Christians as well: “For what shall it profit a man, if he 
                                                                                                     
 28. To the extent that most do subscribe to such separation, I would concur 
with the following sentiments expressed by Professor Johnson: “Having 
abandoned the quest for unity of aesthetic or philosophical vision, the postmodern 
sensibility may regard this question as not only hopelessly opaque but pointless 
even to ask.  Such regard, however, says more about the emptiness of the 
postmodern outlook than the enduring value of the question.” Id. at 866 n.3. 
 29. See Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2013) [hereinafter Colombo, The Naked Private Square] (“In other words, what 
has brought about this separation of ‘church and business?’ As an initial matter, 
the separation does not appear to be a particularly natural one, in the sense that 
it fails to comport with the traditions of human society.”). 
 30. See id. at 11 (“It is not simply the case that work traditionally possessed 
a religious dimension but rather that it was also traditionally understood that 
‘every economic decision has a moral consequence.’” (quoting GEORGE P. 
SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM J. KOSHELNYK, GOOD RETURNS: MAKING MONEY BY MORALLY 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTING xvi (2010))). 
 31. And, in more modern times, we see these concerns affect decisions on 
how to invest money as well, with the advent of socially-responsible and 
religiously-directed mutual funds.   
 32. Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 11–12 (2013).   
 33. See id. at 11 (“[I]t was . . . traditionally understood that ‘every economic 
decision has a moral consequence.’” (quoting GEORGE P. SCHWARTZ & WILLIAM J. 
KOSHELNYK, GOOD RETURNS: MAKING MONEY BY MORALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
xvi (2010))). 
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gain the whole world, and suffer the loss of his soul?”34 Would not 
this apply to matters less weighty than the whole world? Would 
not this apply to the gain of stock dividends or additional income 
as well? Of course it would.35 
St. Paul also addressed this same concept, but from a proactive 
angle: “Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all 
to the glory of God . . . All whatsoever you do in word or in work, 
all things do ye in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ.”36  
Nearly two-thousand years later, G.K. Chesterton essentially 
summarized St. Paul in his own words when he wrote:  
You say grace before meals. All right. But I say grace before the 
concert and the opera, and grace before the play and 
pantomime, and grace before I open a book, and grace before 
sketching, painting, swimming, fencing, boxing, walking, 
playing, dancing and grace before I dip the pen in the ink.37 
In short, there is a long and venerable tradition within which 
practically everything we say, do, and encounter ought to be 
treated as a matter of religious concern. The activity of the 
corporation is not exempt from this. Indeed, corporate activity 
frequently (if not virtually always) overlaps with matters upon 
which religion has much to say. Consequently, the faithful 
religious consumer, worker, officer, director, or shareholder should 
be expected to take his or her religious principles and beliefs into 
account when interacting with (or within) the business 
corporation. As Professor Johnson observed: “Given the 
interconnectedness of our work and personal lives, the 
institutional answer [to the purpose of the corporation] inevitably 
spills into and colors our sense of individual meaning as well.”38  
                                                                                                     
 34. Mark 8:36 (Douay-Rheims). 
 35. Cf. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 877 (“Given the 
interconnectedness of our work and personal lives, the institutional answer [to 
the purpose of the corporation] inevitably spills into and colors our sense of 
individual meaning as well.”). 
 36. 1 Corinthians 10:31; Colossians 3:17. 
 37. Gilbert K. Chesterton Quote, IZ QUOTES, http://izquotes.com/quote/295385 
(last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 38. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 877. 
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IV. Corporations and Religion 
The modern business corporation, and indeed corporate law 
itself, overflows with interpersonal interactions, and continuously 
implicates how we, as human beings, ought to treat one another. 
Thus, our observations about the interconnectedness of faith and 
work are particularly relevant to the corporation itself.  
Indeed, just as economics was originally a branch of moral 
philosophy (as mentioned above), “corporation law exists, not as an 
isolated body of rules and principles, but rather in a historical 
setting and as a part of a larger body of law premised upon shared 
values.”39 The duty of care, for example, central to corporate law, 
is rich with religious meaning, as Professor Johnson has pointed 
out in his scholarship.40 “Fiduciary duties retain a moral and 
spiritual quality even in the highly secularized discourse of 
twenty-first century corporate law.”41  Thus, one need not strain to 
see the overlapping territory of religious and corporate concern—
the confluence is, quite frequently, in plain sight.  
And even putting aside the moral dimension of “purely” 
economic and fiscal decisions, or fiduciary obligations, “[d]irectors 
and managers, as representatives of shareholders, vicariously 
confront moral choices all the time and they should address them 
in just that way—as moral choices.”42 
Nevertheless, just as many separate faith and work, still more 
view the corporation as an inherently and thoroughly secular 
institution.43 Narrower still, the corporation, and even corporate 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 919 (1990) (quoting City Capital Assocs. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551 
A.2d 787, 800 (Del. Ch. 1988), appeal dismissed as moot, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 
1988)). 
 40. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 
28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 28, 43 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, After Enron] (“Modern 
corporate law has inherited, but risks squandering, a rich, moral 
vocabulary . . . . Religious stories confirm the central place of care.”); see also 
Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1, 28 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness] (“Fiduciary duties 
retain a moral and spiritual quality even in the highly secularized discourse of 
twenty-first century corporate law.”). 
 41. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 28. 
 42. Lyman Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, 70 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 957, 963 (2002) [hereinafter Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of 
Corporate Responsibility]. 
 43. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 2 (“The 
822 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017) 
law, is commonly analyzed only under economic lenses—to the 
exclusion of several other fields of human knowledge.44 As such, 
attempts to introduce religious concerns or insights into an 
analysis of the corporation are quite alien to the field of corporate 
law and typically jarring to the corporate lawyer.45 
Religion itself appears to shoulder some of the blame for this. 
Sustained attention upon the nature of the corporate form from 
religious quarters has generally been lacking.46 Professor Johnson 
commented upon this “failure of Christian thought to attend 
specifically to the linking of faith and work,”47 adding that it “leads 
managers . . . to live ‘a divided life.’”48 
That said, there have been exceptions to this. In recent times, 
Michael Novak stands out as someone who has seriously 
undertaken the work of crafting a “theology of the corporation.”49 
He has his predecessors, however. Pope Pius XI, for example, 
sketched a tradition of corporate purpose quite different from the 
common account put forth by Berle and Means.50 Under the 
                                                                                                     
vocabulary of corporate law theory may be secular because that which is 
observed—the corporation—is thought to be a wholly secular institution best 
understood solely in secular terms, or because the overarching conceptual 
framework of most scholars is itself exclusively secular, thereby overlooking the 
corporation’s religious dimension.”).  
 44. See Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1713, 1722 (1993) (“We need . . . to search for insights in the fields of 
anthropology, sociology, political science, ethics and theology, psychology, and 
industrial organization.”). 
 45. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 17 
The general lack of attention to the role of religious faith in corporate 
law is surprising, given that corporate law, like other areas of law, has 
been assessed from a host of other standpoints. Much of the ‘silence’ in 
corporate scholarship may . . . simply stem from a lack of interest in 
religion on the part of legal scholars or from a belief that religion is 
irrelevant to modern corporate theory. It may also reflect adherence to 
a ‘norm’ among legal academics generally to the effect that religion and 
legal scholarship do not mix. 
 46. See id. (“[V]ery little corporate law scholarship examines the corporation 
from a religious vantage point.”).  
 47. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in Educating 
(Christian) Business Managers About Corporate Purpose 31 (University of St. 
Thomas School of Law, Working Paper No. 08–22, 2008) [hereinafter Johnson, A 
Role for Law and Lawyers].  
 48. Id. 
 49. MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 33 (1990). 
 50. See Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 67 (“[U]nlike Berle and 
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Catholic Social Teaching tradition in which Pius XI wrote, 
“business either moves on a trajectory that sees itself as an 
‘association of individuals’ or as a ‘community of persons,’”51 the 
former of which supports a more contractarian vision of the 
corporation, the latter of which supports a more communitarian 
view of the corporation (a point to which we shall return).  
Pope John Paul II addressed the corporation, identifying the 
organization as a “community of persons.”52 More recently, Pope 
Benedict XVI stated that any conceptualization of the corporation 
must be grounded upon “a comprehensive picture of man which 
respects all the dimensions of his being and which subordinates his 
material and instinctive dimensions to his interior and spiritual 
ones.”53 In other words, “[w]hile it is true that human beings are 
individuals who have self-interests and seek utility, they are not 
only individuals but also persons with a spiritual and relational 
dimension.”54 This remains true whether these persons are serving 
as officers, directors, or shareholders of a corporation. 
Admittedly, however, the voices above remain in the minority 
when it comes to the common conceptualization of the corporation. 
Instead, as alluded to earlier, economic analysis has largely 
monopolized the field of corporate discourse.55 This monopolization 
extends not only to scholarly commentary on corporate law and the 
corporation itself, but also to the understanding that officers and 
directors have regarding the proper fulfillment of their duties to 
                                                                                                     
Means, he encouraged business leaders to move from understanding the firm as 
only an investor-centered exchange of contracts and market incentives to one of 
relationship or partnership between capital and labor that would be drawn from 
the larger moral and religious culture.”). 
 51. Id. at 68. 
 52. See id. at 73 (“[A]lthough Pius XI began to develop a view of the 
corporation as a partnership and community, it was not until 1991 that John Paul 
II provided one of the most explicit definitions of the purpose of business within 
Catholic social teachings by using the phrase ‘community of persons.’”). 
 53. Id. at 77 (quoting Benedict XVI, Caritas in veritate, 36). 
 54. Id. at 74. 
 55. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 1–2 
Discourse in corporate law theory is highly secular. This quality both 
reflects, and shapes, the nature of discourse within corporations 
themselves. Virtually nontheoretical until the mid-1970s, corporate 
law scholarship has been deeply influenced in the last thirty years by 
neoclassical economic analysis, and, more recently, it has been 
enriched by a host of other perspectives.  
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the corporation. This has led to a pernicious view of the corporate 
boardroom as values-free zone focused solely on economic profit 
and loss. 
It has been said that the devil’s greatest accomplishment was 
to convince the world that he doesn’t exist. Analogously, perhaps 
it has been the greatest accomplishment of law-and-economics 
scholars to convince the world that efficiency and economics are 
value neutral.56 For it is exactly this perspective that has helped 
further the notion that corporate officers and directors ought not 
interject their values into corporate decision-making, but should, 
rather, adhere to the purportedly value-neutral program of 
maximizing profits for the benefit of the corporation’s 
shareholders.57 This awful myth has had profoundly negative 
consequences. For “[t]here is no moral free zone”58 as Professor 
Johnson has pointed out. Prioritizing efficiency is as much of a 
value judgment as any other. Similarly, operating a business to 
maximize profits is a value judgment just as any other. Regardless 
of whether a person agrees or disagrees with the propriety of 
prioritizing efficiency and profit maximization, he or she ought to 
acknowledge the fairly modest assertion that these positions 
necessarily reflect certain value-choices. Indeed, these reflect 
rather profound value-choices, and as such reinforce the point that 
corporate conduct implicates the kinds of concerns over which 
religion has traditionally (and continues to have) a great deal to 
say. For contrary to the popular modern misconception, the vast 
majority of religious teaching and exhortation is not about sex. It 
is more typically about how one best fulfills his or her duties to 
God. This, in turn, is ordinarily worked out via a person’s 
treatment of and interactions with his fellow man (sexual ethics is 
but one inevitable sub-set of this).  
                                                                                                     
 56. I don’t mean to compare those in the law-and-economics movement to the 
devil.  
 57. See Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 70  
In the shareholder-centric view, the corporation favors the shareholder 
as the central claimant in the corporation. Those who manage 
corporate assets are not thought to have the power to choose among 
values. Instead, within this “association of shares,” the firm serves 
largely as a locus for exchanging outputs and inputs, where managers 
seek to maximize re-turns for shareholders.  
 58. Id. at 68. 
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V. The Necessarily Religious Understanding of Corporate Purpose 
Let us now return to the three possible options that are 
presented to us with regard to religious conceptualizations of 
corporate purpose, as highlighted at the outset of this Essay. For 
easier analysis, I have reframed and reordered them here: 
 Option 1: By virtue of its nature, the corporation 
cannot have a religious purpose 
 Option 2: By virtue of its nature, the corporation 
may or may not, within its own discretion, have a 
religious purpose  
 Option 3: By virtue of its nature, the corporation 
must have a religious purpose 
Although I have already announced my preference for Option 
3, here I will nevertheless march through all three options 
methodically, elaborating upon the deficiencies afflicting Options 
1 and 2. 
In a number of states, including New York59 and New Jersey,60 
state corporate law explicitly addresses, in great detail, “religious 
corporations.” By “religious corporations,” the statutes do not 
mean entities such as Hobby Lobby or Chick-fil-A, but rather 
parishes, congregations, dioceses, and the like.61 In these states, 
religious entities are organized explicitly as corporations.62 As 
would be expected, their purposes are inherently religious in 
nature. 
Some may balk, however, and assert that the observation set 
forth above is irrelevant. They would point out that “business 
corporations,” are the focus here, and not non-profit “religious 
corporations.” They would want to reformulate Option 1 as: “By 
virtue of its nature, the business corporation cannot have a 
religious purpose.” I will allow that reformulation for argument’s 
sake, but before doing so I would like to point out the weakness of 
the distinction between a “for-profit” corporation and a “non-profit” 
corporation. 
                                                                                                     
 59. N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW (McKinney 2016).  
 60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16 (West 2016). 
 61. See generally N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2016); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 16:1–1 (West 2016). 
 62. See generally N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 16:1–1. 
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The naysayers essentially claim “for-profit corporations 
cannot have a religious purpose.” They are willing to concede, as 
they absolutely must, that the universe of organizations that take 
on the corporate form includes some that are explicitly religious.63 
Such religious corporations must be, they argue, invariably 
nonprofit in form. And the line between for-profit and nonprofit 
corporations is a thick one and shall not be crossed.  
But is it not crossed quite frequently? As has Professor 
Johnson, I have previously questioned the for-profit and non-profit 
distinction.64 Both such entities, regardless of their categorization, 
typically work very hard to increase revenues and reduce costs.65 
Indeed, the day-to-day operations of both for-profit and nonprofit 
corporations can closely resemble one another. 
Nevertheless, the significant difference between the two (as 
the argument goes) is that for-profit corporations are viewed as 
entirely profit-driven, whereas non-profit corporations are viewed 
as “mission” driven.66 “Mission” driven is understood as some 
philanthropic or charitable cause—not strictly a focus on the 
organization’s bottom line.67 This is, however, repeatedly belied in 
practice. The NCAA, for example, is an $11 billion “non-profit” 
corporation.68 A large number of “for-profit” business corporations 
not only enjoy far less income, but, moreover, are demonstrably 
more dedicated to philanthropic causes and concerns.69 Put 
                                                                                                     
 63. Supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 17 (“Perhaps 
the current typology of ‘for profit’ and ‘not for profit’ organizations is too 
dichotomous if the former means only a focus on maximizing returns to capital.”). 
 65. See id. (“To be sure, business corporations will and must make 
profits . . . .”).  
 66. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION 71–74 (2015) (discussing the alleged distinction between for-profit 
and nonprofit corporations).  
 67. See generally What is a Mission-Driven Business?, TERRAPASS: THE 
FOOTPRINT BLOG, https://www.terrapass.com/what-is-a-missi (last visited Mar. 
28, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 68. Andrew Syrios, The NCAA Racket: $10 Billion ‘Non-Profit’ Organization, 
VALUE WALK (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:38 PM), http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/09/ncaa-
business/ (last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 69. See Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, 
FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/ 
2012/01/13/the-rise-of-the-charitable-for-profit-entity/#fbff0be291cc (last visited 
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differently, it is mistaken to suggest that nonprofits are invariably 
more “mission-oriented” and that “for-profits” are invariable more 
“revenue-oriented.” Quite frequently, these characteristics are 
reversed.  
Critically, as Professors Johnson and Millon have pointed out 
time and again, there is nothing in corporate law that precludes a 
for-profit business corporation from being mission-oriented, even 
at the sacrifice of some degree of profitability.70 “Perhaps the 
current typology of ‘for-profit’ and ‘not-for-profit’ organizations is 
too dichotomous if the former means only a focus on maximizing 
returns to capital.”71 
But, even if we acknowledge the possibility, or recognize the 
reality, of mission-driven, for-profit corporations, does it follow 
that a corporation can be religious in nature as well? Might a 
for-profit business corporation with a religious purpose be simply 
a bridge too far? I find myself again in agreement with Professor 
Johnson who wrote, in 2006, that “[a] business corporation . . . is 
not, and need not be, inherently secular in nature.”72 There exist 
several companies whose “founders and leaders . . . were culturally 
embedded in a faith tradition that influenced how they and their 
families understood business.”73 Many go a step further and 
embrace a fundamentally religious purpose. Hobby Lobby and 
Chick-fil-A come to mind. 
                                                                                                     
May 2, 2017) (describing “two new types of corporations have been created to 
address the goals of making money, attracting private investors and addressing 
societal concerns”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 70. See Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 19 (“[I]t is not 
law—where managerial discretion is broad, though still constrained by fiduciary 
duties—that silences the religious voice within corporations.”). I personally 
quibble with Professors Johnson and Millon over the legal force of the 
shareholder-wealth-maximization norm. Whereas they read Dodge v. Ford as 
nonbinding, I generally believe that it does accurately describe the duties of a 
corporation’s directors.  That said, I readily concede that, practically speaking, 
due to the business judgment rule, a corporation’s officers and directors would 
ordinarily have wide latitude in pursuing objectives aside from the maximization 
of corporate profits. 
 71. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 17. 
 72. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 3; see also Johnson et 
al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 68 (“Berle and Means and Pius XI reflect two 
different models, and two different traditions, of the corporation’s purpose which 
have developed over the last eighty years.”). 
 73. Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 74–75 (2013). 
828 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 813 (2017) 
According to Hobby Lobby: “We are committed to: (1) Honoring 
the Lord in all we do by operating the company in a manner 
consistent with Biblical principles . . . .”74 That is a religious 
purpose. So, unless one is willing to assert that Hobby Lobby is 
lying to itself and the public (an assertion that was not raised in 
federal litigation when there was ample opportunity and incentive 
to do so),75 then it is simply undeniable that this particular 
corporation does, in fact, have a religious purpose.  
Indeed, the law itself in many states has come to recognize 
that corporations need not exist for solely the purpose of 
maximizing profits.76 Via the promulgation of “Benefit 
Corporation” statutes, business organizations in a growing 
number of states are explicitly authorized to take into account 
concerns of social interest—concerns that go beyond simply those 
of profit maximization.77 “Benefit Corp. statutes illuminate the 
unresolved muddle in corporate law doctrine and theory 
concerning the inter-relationship among corporate purpose, a 
corporation’s best interests, and fiduciary duties.”78  
In light of the overwhelming evidence that religiously inspired 
business corporations do exist,79 and in light of changes in 
corporate law authorizing such corporations to exist,80 why would 
anyone continue to contest this fact? I would posit it is because 
                                                                                                     
 74. Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story 
(last visited May 2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 75. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 76. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and 
Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 270 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Pluralism in Corporate Form] (“Pioneered by Maryland in 2010, Benefit Corp. 
statutes subsequently sailed through the New York and New Jersey legislatures 
without a single dissenting vote.”). 
 77. See RONALD J. COLOMBO, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION 62–63 (2015) (“The New York benefit corporation statute (which is 
typical), proclaims that the corporation’s directors and officers ‘shall not be 
required to give priority to the interests of any particular person or group . . . over 
the interests of any other person or group.’”). 
 78. Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form, supra note 76, at 298. 
 79. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 21 (suggesting 
that a newly formed company is likely created by an individual influenced by 
religion given that fifty-five percent of Americans generally prioritize religion in 
life). 
 80. See id. at 50–51 (explaining that states were beginning to allow 
businesses to incorporate for any purpose even absent public-oriented objectives).  
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they are not happy with what they see as the repercussions of 
acknowledging it. It is akin to Joan Osborne’s 1995 song “One of 
Us.” That’s the song that kept plaintively asking “what if God was 
one of us?”81 In one of her verses, Osborne sings the following:  
If God had a face, what would it look like? 
And would you want to see 
If seeing meant that you would have to believe 
In things like Heaven and in Jesus and the saints 
And all the prophets?82  
In short, commentators fear that by acknowledging that 
corporations could have a religious purpose, they would be buying 
into a parade of horribles.83 This would include, but not be limited 
to religious exemptions against contraceptive coverage, a right to 
discrimination (especially against sexual minorities), and the 
unwelcome proselytizing of employees and customers.84 I think it 
is pretty unmistakable that this is what drives a large part of the 
opposition against recognizing the possibility that business 
corporations can be legitimately religious. 
Frankly, this opposition is understandable, as these issues 
touch upon some deep cultural, ideological, and philosophical 
concerns that divide our nation. But scholars and all informed 
individuals of good faith ought to defuse the situation by noting 
that one acknowledgment does not entail the other. That is, as a 
matter of law, under both the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, simply adhering to a set of 
religious beliefs does not automatically afford one the right to a 
religious exemption.85 Indeed, in the vast majority of situations, 
individuals and religious institutions (even unquestionably 
religious institutions) are afforded no relief whatsoever from laws 
                                                                                                     
 81. JOAN OSBORNE, One of Us, on RELISH (Blue Gorilla Records 1995). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 12–13 (“It was 
simply seen as unwise to introduce a subject as ‘divisive’ as religion into the 
business setting, which thrives on unity, stability, and peace.”).  
 84. See id. at 81 (“The primary objection that can be anticipated is the fear 
of rampant discrimination in hiring, accommodation, and other areas in the wake 
of corporate Free Exercise rights.”).  
 85. See id. (“Consequently, recognition of corporate Free Exercise rights does 
not mean that corporations will be necessarily absolved of compliance with 
laws . . . even if they happen to be fervently religious in character.”).  
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that violate the dictates of their religiously informed consciences 
and principles.86  
That said, it would be disingenuous not to acknowledge that 
recognition of a corporation’s religious purpose certainly opens the 
door to such developments, whereas avoiding recognition of a 
corporation’s religious purpose would seem to keep the door tightly 
shut. However, it is, in my opinion, one of the worst tendencies of 
advocates, and one that oftentimes borders on intellectual 
dishonesty, to unreasonably insist on yielding no ground 
whatsoever on a given point out of fear of what might eventually 
follow therefrom. I suggest that if a given situation or context most 
reasonably suggests a particular characterization or result, that 
characterization or result ought to follow on the strength of its own 
merits; it ought not be held back or denied out of fear of some other, 
hypothetical situation or context that might thereafter arise. 
But to assuage such understandable fears, it should be 
recognized that courts and administrative agencies may very well 
settle upon different standards with regard to religious 
exemptions—one for individuals, one for churches, and one for 
religiously motivated business corporations. In other words, the 
complicated and controversial field of religious exemptions and 
accommodations is an issue separate and apart from the question 
of whether or not a business corporation can be deemed to be 
religious.  
Thus, in the face of evidence that some for-profit business 
corporations are, in fact, formed and operated pursuant to an 
explicit religious purpose,87 it seems foolish to argue that this is 
inconceivable. To do so (and if you will forgive another pop culture 
reference) reminds me of the film A Princess Bride,88 in which the 
character, Vizzini, frequently proclaims something that has just 
happened to be “inconceivable.” In reply another character, Inigo 
                                                                                                     
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“Not all burdens 
on religion are unconstitutional. The state may justify a limitation on religious 
liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental 
interest.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 87. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 20 
(illustrating how biblical principles directed the business approach of 
Chick-Fil-A’s founder).  
 88. THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987). 
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Montoya, responds, “[y]ou keep using that word. I do not think it 
means what you think it means.”89 
Option 2 would, therefore, seem to represent much firmer 
ground. This is the perspective that a corporation may or may not 
have a religious purpose depending on its own wishes. For every 
corporation that has selected an identifiable religious purpose 
(such as Hobby Lobby), there are dozens that have not.90 Thus, 
Option 2 seems unassailable. 
And if Option 2 is unassailable, logic would dictate that Option 
3 must be rejected. For Option 3 posited that “by virtue of its 
nature, the corporation must have a religious purpose.” Just as the 
existence of corporations with a religious purpose defeated Option 
1, the existence of corporations lacking a religious purpose defeats 
Option 3. Case closed. 
Or is it? Is there really such a thing as a corporation lacking a 
religious purpose? If I am correct in stating, as I did earlier, that 
both religion and corporations share a common fundamental 
purpose (to attain human happiness), would it not follow that all 
corporations, by definition, possess a religious purpose regardless 
of their declared objectives? I suggest that this may be so. In other 
words, if the pursuit of happiness (along with the means by which 
this pursuit is conducted) is an inextricably religious undertaking, 
and if the profit-maximizing objective of the paradigmatic business 
corporation is simply one instantiation of that basic human 
longing, then it would seem to follow that the purpose of the 
business corporation, any business corporation, is necessarily and 
inescapably religious by its very nature. This is regardless of the 
intentions of the corporation’s founders, owners, employees, and 
customers (although, in fairness, sometimes explicitly pursuant to 
them). 
                                                                                                     
 89. The Princess Bride Quotes, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt 
0093779/quotes (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) (providing specific character quotes 
from the film) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 90. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 6 (“The 
modern business corporation is commonly portrayed as a thoroughly secular 
institution in which religion plays no role and has no place.”).  
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VI. Repercussions 
The conclusion that the business corporation is, by its nature, 
necessarily an institution with a religious purpose gives rise to a 
number of consequences and repercussions. Some of these have 
been touched upon previously.91 
Primary among these might be the contribution that a 
religious understanding of corporate purpose can have to the 
ongoing debate between contractarians on the one hand and 
communitarians on the other.92 This debate is focused largely on 
the shareholder primacy norm—whether it ought to persist and, if 
so, how it ought to be understood.93  
What is at stake [in this debate] is a profound difference in 
normative world view. This ideological difference defines the 
basic divide between communitarians and contractarians . . . . 
Contractarians start from the presumption that people ought to 
be free to make their own choices about how to live their 
lives . . .  
Communitarians [believe] . . . individuals owe obligations to 
each other that exist independently of contract . . . . The state 
acts appropriately when it enforces such duties.94  
To most contractarians, the corporation is “merely an 
intersection of atomistic contracting individuals.”95 From this it 
ordinarily follows that the corporation exists to serve, primarily, 
the interests of the shareholders.96 These interests, in turn, are 
                                                                                                     
 91. See supra Part V (discussing commentators’ fears over contraception 
coverage, employer discrimination, and proselytization).  
 92. See David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law: Communitarians, 
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 
1375–76 (1993) [hereinafter Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law] (“[T]hirty states 
have passed statutes that allow management to consider enumerated 
nonshareholder interests (in addition to those of shareholders) in corporate 
decisionmaking.”). 
 93. See id. at 1377 (“The possibility of effective shareholder control seems to 
promise a revolution in corporate governance no less startling than the emergence 
into plain view of nonshareholder considerations.”). 
 94. Id. at 1382–83. 
 95. Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical World, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 161, 177 (1992). 
 96. See id. at 178 (“Corporate activity surely shapes individual preferences 
and behavior as well as being shaped by them.”) (emphasis added).  
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typically reduced to that of maximizing economic returns.97 This is 
currently the prevalent understanding of the corporation: that “the 
business firm—in its typical form, the corporation—is managed, or 
at least should be managed, in the sole interest of the body of 
shareholders . . . .”98  
If a detour may be permitted, I have long questioned the 
appropriateness of equating shareholder primacy with shareholder 
wealth maximization.99 So too has Professor Johnson, who queried, 
“whether shareholders themselves really reject calls for more 
socially responsible conduct. Do we wrongly caricature them in 
portraying them as intolerant of socially/morally responsible 
conduct?”100 This digression introduces the possibility of 
recognizing a more socially responsible conceptualization of 
officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duties within the existing 
framework of the shareholder primacy norm.101 Unfortunately, few 
others have shown an appetite for reformulating shareholder 
primacy along these lines.102 As such, the contractarians and 
communitarians somewhat resemble the entrenched Entente and 
Central armies of World War I along the Western Front. 
According to the communitarians (a term I am using to 
broadly cover the advocates of “progressive corporate law” and 
stakeholder theorists), the corporation ought not be beholden to 
                                                                                                     
 97. See Ronald J. Colombo, Ownership, Limited: Reconciling Traditional and 
Progressive Corporate Law via an Aristotelian Understanding of Ownership, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 247, 258–59 (2008) [hereinafter Colombo, Ownership, Limited] 
(discussing how shareholders provide equity investment in exchange for the 
expectation of officers’ and directors’ fiduciary duties). 
 98. Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between Judicial and Legislative 
Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. LAW 35, 40 (1988) (quoting 
M. AOKI, THE CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 3 (1984)). 
 99. See Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note at 97, 268–69 (discussing 
the main objective for the board of directors is to maximize shareholder wealth). 
 100. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42, 
at 965. 
 101. See Colombo, Ownership, Limited, supra note at 97, 268–69 (“Many (if 
not most) individuals subscribe to values and principles that surpass material 
wealth in order of importance, and routinely factor moral and ethical concerns 
into their decision-making.”). 
 102. See id. at 267 (“[T]he predominant modern view of property ownership 
largely disclaims moral obligations . . . . shareholders . . . are usually viewed as 
mere investors, detached from any personal moral obligations derived from their 
status as owners of a corporation.”).  
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shareholders alone—or perhaps even to the shareholders 
primarily.103 Rather, the corporation’s officers and directors are 
compelled to take into account the interests of various corporate 
constituencies, including, for example, employees and 
consumers.104 Naturally, “[c]ommunitarians also differ from 
contractarians in emphasizing the broad social effects of corporate 
activity,”105 and as such the corporate social responsibility 
movement is largely fueled by communitarian perspectives of 
corporate law.106 
Professors Johnson and Millon have long asserted that “[t]he 
idea of shareholder primacy . . . no longer commands general 
respect.”107 At the same time, however, they have been forced to 
recognize that “[i]f corporate law is to move beyond exclusive 
concern for shareholders, some will seek to develop a new 
theoretical foundation upon which a new body of doctrine can be 
erected . . . . Those who say that communitarians have not yet 
articulated a fully developed alternative agenda are correct.”108 I 
suggest that by conceptualizing the purpose of the corporation as 
inherently (or unavoidably) religious, we travel further down the 
road toward such a new theoretical foundation. We do so by 
infusing our understanding of the corporation with 
“other-regarding, caring impulse[s] and some subduing of the 
egoistic, self-serving impulse. We need this both in our personal 
lives and in our institutional lives, of which the business 
corporation is just one instance.”109 Indeed, it may even help 
legitimize the corporation, for our current decision to “rest the 
corporation’s legitimacy on faithful allegiance to capital is to 
                                                                                                     
 103. See id. at 255–58 (examining the inevitable reduction of employees and 
increased layoffs following a corporate takeover). 
 104. See id. (“[S]tate legislatures across the United States passed 
“constituency” statutes that enable . . . boards to take into account the interests 
of nonshareholder stakeholders in corporate decision-making.”). 
 105. See Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1379. 
 106. See id. (“Communitarians see corporations as more than just 
agglomerations of private contracts; they’re powerful institutions whose conduct 
has substantial public implications.”). 
 107. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate 
Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1210 (1993). 
 108. Millon, Crisis in Corporate Law, supra note 92, at 1387. 
 109. Johnson, Reclaiming an Ethic of Corporate Responsibility, supra note 42, 
at 967. 
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demean the contributions of others and, in the end, to expect very 
little of the institution.”110 
How would a religious understanding of corporate purpose 
help accomplish this and further a more communitarian vision of 
corporate law? This is possible in a number of ways.  
For starters, it would reinvigorate a more balanced 
understanding of the duties of officers and directors.111 “As we 
currently stand in the midst of a seemingly strict shareholder 
primacy theoretical era, it should be recalled that normative 
positions on corporate purpose have dramatically changed, 
historically.”112 Similarly, “[i]deas about what corporations are, 
and the normative implications that follow from those ideas, have 
changed radically over time.”113 
A religious understanding of corporate purpose would harken 
us back to yesteryear—to a time when the shareholder primacy 
norm was not ensconced in corporate law to the same degree as it 
is today. As Professor Millon has explained: 
Radical shareholder primacy’s conception of corporate 
governance contrasts with an older, long-established model that 
I term traditional shareholder primacy . . . . Once it is 
understood that the [radical] agency model is aspirational 
rather than grounded in corporate law, a more serious 
conversation about corporate purpose and the desirable balance 
of power between management and shareholders can occur.114 
This would, in turn, help justify an approach to corporate law 
that is far more accommodating to the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies than the prevailing approach. In place of the 
current “fragmented and cramped conception of corporate purpose” 
                                                                                                     
 110. Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 
supra note 1, at 822. 
 111. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note 29, at 87–88 
(“[F]ailure to recognize the religious liberty rights of the business 
corporation . . . undermine[s] both the spirit and the efficacy of the First 
Amendment and call[s] into question our nation’s alleged commitment to 
pluralism, diversity, and tolerance.”).  
 112. Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business 
Judgement Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. OF CORP. L. 405, 438 (2013). 
 113. David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 262 
(1990). 
 114. David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 
1043–44 (2013). 
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a religious understanding of corporate purpose would invite a more 
serious discussion about how the corporation “can both be better 
governed and contribute more positively to society.”115  
A religious understanding of corporate purpose would also 
reinvigorate our approach to fiduciary duties, as alluded to 
previously.116 For “[m]odern corporate law has inherited . . . a rich, 
moral vocabulary[]”117 that has largely been squandered by the 
“quest to bottom law on economic efficiency . . . .”118 “The historic 
decision within corporate law initially to deploy a moral vocabulary 
suggests a view that a moral subject matter was under 
consideration.”119 
Since “[r]eligious stories confirm the central place of care[,]”120 
religion can serve a useful role in fleshing out the full depths of 
corporate fiduciary duties. A religious reading of fiduciary duties 
could, for example, help justify “a ‘covenantal interpretation’ of the 
corporation.”121  
Some might protest that, regardless of its desirability, any 
effort to veer from the shareholder wealth maximization runs afoul 
established corporate law.122 Professor Johnson has repeatedly 
attacked this notion, arguing “not a single corporate statute 
explicitly addresses the purpose of corporate activity.”123 He has 
added “no U.S. law requires a business corporation to maximize 
shareholder wealth except in one unusual setting. Instead, the law 
is ambivalent as to, and therefore remarkable permissive on, the 
question of corporate purpose, according senior managers 
significant discretion on a matter of signal importance.”124 Put 
                                                                                                     
 115. Johnson et al., Rethinking, supra note 26, at 60. 
 116. See supra Part VI (comparing shareholder primacy with shareholder 
wealth maximization).  
 117. Johnson, After Enron, supra note 40, at 28. 
 118. Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty, supra note 3, at 2236. 
 119. Johnson, After Enron, supra note 40, at 53–54. 
 120. Id. at 43. 
 121. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness, supra note 40, at 16. 
 122. See Colombo, The Naked Private Square, supra note supra note 29, at 6–
7 (“[M]any balk at the notion that a business corporation should be afforded any 
First Amendment rights . . . . The corporation is truly ‘monomaniac[al]’ and 
‘soulless,’ existing for the singular purpose of profit-maximization . . . .”).  
 123. Johnson, Delaware Judiciary, supra note 27, at 874. 
 124. Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers, supra note 47, at 4. 
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quite simply, “managers possess sufficient discretion to make 
moral choices[,]” 125 even religiously based moral choices. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Hobby 
Lobby126 case, concerning the “contraceptive mandate” 
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services in 
the wake of the Affordable Care Act, drives this point home quite 
forcefully.127 For in that case, “the United States Supreme Court 
speaks clearly to the fundamental issue of corporate purpose and 
states correctly that corporate law authorizes non-profit-
maximizing behavior.”128  
However, merely recognizing that the constraints of the 
shareholder wealth maximization norm on managerial discretion 
are largely illusory is not enough. As Professor Johnson wrote: “the 
necessary pre-condition—freedom—is not a sufficient condition for 
successful reform. Also essential is a willingness to act and the 
knowledge of how to act.”129 He continued: 
Appreciating the scope of managerial freedom to act is thus the 
necessary first step, but by itself not a sufficient step, for 
attaining managerial conduct congruent with religious tenets. 
To be given proper expression in the business-legal world, 
religious convictions require a vocabulary that can mediate the 
discourse of spiritual-religious insight, on the one hand, and 
compliance with business and legal duties in the secular world, 
on the other hand.130 
Thus, although “no changes in positive law are needed to 
introduce religious perspectives into corporate law,”131 normative 
and cultural changes are probably necessary:  
[I]t is not law—where managerial discretion is broad, though 
still constrained by fiduciary duties—that silences the religious 
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voice within corporations. Rather, it is the secularization of 
corporate law discourse itself, along with social norms and 
linguistic practices within corporations themselves, that hinder 
free expression and therefore need reforming.132  
This would take quite a bit of work, especially after decades of 
fixation on wealth maximization. It would not be an 
understatement to declare that, within the context of the 
corporation, “moral discourse must be rejuvenated . . . .”133 This 
would require “a willingness to engage in moral dialogue and 
moral encounter”134 on the part of officers and directors—a far cry 
from the current practice in which “directors enter the boardroom, 
and abandon their pre-existing moral vision . . . .”135 
Perhaps, however, the difficulty here is being overstated. For 
if given the choice, “[i]t would be odd if business managers 
themselves . . . did not draw on their deepest, most cherished 
convictions in ascertaining how to think and act in the business 
sphere.”136 
Were such a normative transformation to be unleashed, the 
effects upon corporate social responsible would be profound. For as 
things currently stand, “[m]any citizens and business actors 
continue to believe . . . that if one is obeying the law, then one is 
also necessarily behaving in a morally responsible manner.”137 
This is damning, as pursuant to this approach all law becomes a 
de minimis form of morality that the vast majority of people would 
most likely reject if they thoughtfully considered it. Yet, 
nevertheless, officers and directors find themselves constrained to 
the law itself, hesitant to venture much beyond its requirements.138 
Liberating corporate officers and directors from this worldview 
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would empower them to embrace a more fully human morality: one 
that comports with their own intuitions and values, and not one 
watered-down by the compromise and pragmatism of the 
legislative process. This would also invite those officers and 
directors who were not particularly religious to more comfortably 
assert their deeply held moral beliefs as well—an additional, 
collateral benefit to introducing religious perspectives into 
corporate decision making.  
Thus far, we have considered the societal consequences of a 
religious conception of corporate purpose, especially with regard to 
the phenomenon of corporate social responsibility. We should not 
overlook, however, the consequences of such an understanding 
upon those individuals who are themselves religious (a number 
which is not insignificant).  
Directors and senior officers will be freed from the psychological 
and spiritual burden of keeping two distinct moral frames of 
reference, one for work and the other for the rest of life. Instead, 
they will face the formidable challenge of determining how to 
advance the common corporate good by drawing on 
understandings of faithfulness derived from deeper sources of 
authority, including religious conviction.139  
Not surprisingly, it has been found that the “effort to blend faith 
and work led to more meaningful work experiences for the 
individuals themselves, higher ethical standards, and more human 
employee practices at the company level.”140 In other words, this 
development would permit corporate officers and directors (in 
addition to, perhaps, employees and shareholders) to live more 
integrated lives, in which their professional responsibilities more 
closely aligned with their deepest values and beliefs.141  
Finally, and related to each of the preceding consequences, 
recognition of the undeniably religious purposes of the corporation 
would provide a firmer footing for the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.142 As referenced previously, many 
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commentators continue to challenge the concept of corporate 
religious liberty.143 Although the precise contours and form of this 
liberty is a matter that merits serious thought and reflection, its 
very possibility ought no longer be denied. Recognizing the 
purposes of corporate activity as inherently religious in nature 
helps promote this important debate by setting aside the 
conversation-stopper that any religious understanding of the 
corporation is simply inconceivable. 
Elsewhere, I have studied the question of corporate religious 
liberty.144 As I have argued, corporate religious liberty fosters a 
more robust approach to corporate social responsibility and 
contributes to the possibility of more authentically religious 
corporate environments.145 This is because corporate religious 
liberty enables a business corporation to embrace more fully a 
religious identity, should it wish to do so, or to respond to religious 
influences and impulses even if it forgoes an explicit religious 
identity.146 It is difficult to embrace such identities, many of which 
are counter-cultural, in the face of laws and regulations that serve 
to undermine them.147 To provide just one example, it is difficult to 
see how an authentically Catholic pharmacy could maintain its 
identity as such if forced by law to sell contraceptives and 
abortifacients, given the Catholic Church’s clear and consistent 
teaching against such things.148 Thus, recognition of corporate 
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religious liberty allows corporations to take religion seriously.149 
And a seriously religious corporation will not view itself as merely 
empowered to embrace the obligations posed by a robust 
understanding of corporate social responsibility, but may very well 
find itself compelled to embrace such responsibilities, derived from 
the religious beliefs and convictions upon which it is grounded.150 
Such recognition may also cause the corporation to adopt a 
corporate culture and foster a workplace environment much more 
in keeping with certain religious sensibilities.151 
As referenced previously, a religious understanding of 
corporate purpose certainly stokes the fears of some.152 Two rise to 
the top of this list and merit our attention here. 
The first is that a religious understanding of corporate 
purpose would lead to the existence of more explicitly religious 
business corporations, as described immediately above. Although 
there were times when such a turn of events would have been 
broadly welcome, this is not such a time. To many individuals 
today, “religious” is viewed as equivalent to the sin of all sins: 
intolerance.153 Although this is a characterization that I would 
dispute vehemently and on a number of levels, this article is not a 
piece on religious apologetics, and as such, I shall prescind from 
doing so. I will, however, advert again to the wisdom of Professor 
Johnson, who once wrote: “[I]n a market-oriented, democratic 
society, there is no reason why business corporations do not exhibit 
more institutional pluralism in both ends and approaches to 
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business.”154 In short, I am comfortable with a society in which 
some of us are made uncomfortable by the religiosity of others. 
Given the existing legal parameters in place, I trust that such 
religiosity, just as any other deeply held set of beliefs, will not 
frequently cross society’s lines of impropriety, and as such not give 
rise to unjust discrimination or the like. This takes into account 
the possibility of religious exemptions to such laws—exemptions 
that the courts would be entrusted with policing.  
From a corporate law perspective, some fear that by 
untethering management from a strict duty of shareholder profit 
maximization, we risk unleashing untold abuses upon corporate 
shareholders.155 In other words, corporate fiduciaries cannot be 
trusted to properly exercise such discretion: they will inevitably 
take advantage of the opportunity to shirk their duties or, worse 
still, put shareholders’ interests second to those of their personal 
own.156 Power corrupts, and the danger with corporate mission 
creep is the potential it has for entrusting corporate boards with 
“uncontrollable power.”157  
Here too Professor Johnson has provided us with some 
insightful thoughts to consider: 
Ensuring that managers do not wrongly advance their own 
interests over shareholder welfare is one thing. It is another 
thing, however, to focus so single-mindedly on the second-level, 
‘agency’ problem that the deeper institutional dilemma of 
harmonizing the interests of numerous physically absent 
shareholders with the interests of a host of other corporate 
participants is ignored. Viewed this way, as a subset of the 
universal and longstanding individual/group dilemma, the real 
challenge for corporate directors—and corporate governance—
should have been cast from the outset as the task of figuring out 
how to constrain or induce directors to act in a way that 
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advances the interests of shareholders consistent with fulfilling 
the overarching interests/purposes of the corporate group.158 
In short, there ought to be a better way of constraining or 
policing the conduct of officers and directors. We ought to reject a 
solution that comes with so high a cost as that exacted by the 
wealth maximization norm. As Professor Johnson has explained, 
this current approach may have the tail wagging the dog: 
[B]y stubbornly insisting that management focus exclusively on 
shareholder welfare, corporate law’s dogma may well succeed in 
checking management’s broad discretion. That success, 
however, may come at the expense of preordaining the answer 
to the more fundamental question of whether the single-minded 
apotheosis of capital providers is in fact the proper aim of 
corporate endeavor.159  
Thus, “the belief that corporate managers should be held 
accountable does not logically lead to the conclusion that 
maximizing shareholder wealth is the proper focal point of 
corporate activity.”160  
VII. Conclusion 
Few developments in the legal academy have been as 
influential as that of the law and economics movement. And there 
are few fields that have been more affected by this movement than 
that of corporate law.  
Although law and economics has shed incredible light upon 
many legal problems, and provided powerful analytical tools with 
which to examine the law, it has, unfortunately, contributed to a 
view of the corporation that is entirely economic in nature.161 It has 
helped propel a contractarian understanding of the corporation, 
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and with it an understanding of corporate purpose defined 
narrowly as profit maximization for shareholder benefit.162 
There are, and have always been, competing theories of the 
corporation. These include perspectives that are more 
communitarian in nature, and that stress the concept of corporate 
social responsibility.163 Such theories have, however, largely failed 
to gain much traction in recent times.164 In years past, however, 
these theories have had their day.165 Recognizing the corporation’s 
purpose as fundamentally religious in nature can reclaim much of 
this discarded past. For with this recognition would come a deeper, 
richer understanding of corporate fiduciary duties. It would also 
provide a principled justification (which has thus far proven 
elusive) for greater corporate social responsibility. This, in turn, 
would empower officers and directors to take such responsibility 
more seriously. 
Although a religious conceptualization of corporate purpose 
would admittedly take many by surprise, a careful review of the 
corporation reveals that such a conceptualization is justifiable if 
not unavoidable. Arguably more influential than even the nation 
state in modern times,166 the business corporation is the means by 
which vast numbers of people satisfy their myriad needs and 
desires. It is within their place of corporate employment that 
countless workers spend most of their waking hours.167 It is 
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therefore no exaggeration to claim that for untold numbers of 
individuals, their very salvation will turn upon the decisions they 
make with respect to the corporations they work for, invest in, or 
transact business with. An entity with such influence and power, 
and that touches the lives of virtually every human being, is an 
entity that demands scrutiny under the world’s various religious 
traditions. And once applied, most religious traditions will quickly 
realize that not only corporate activity, but even the very purpose 
of the business corporation is unavoidably religious in nature in 
that that it serves as a critical means by which so many individuals 
pursue their ultimate end.  
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employment and careers.”).  
